A veces lo más revolucionario es volver a los principios básicos. La costarricense Rebeca Grynspan ya es la candidata oficial presentada por el Gobierno de su país para la Secretaría General de Naciones Unidas, que el portugués António Guterres abandonará en diciembre del próximo año. La actual secretaria general de la UNCTAD (Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo) se enfrenta a una campaña larga e intensa, que la llevará por todo el mundo durante meses.

En la cafetería de un hotel londinense, rodeada de papeles y frente a su portátil mientras de fondo se oye en el local una música anodina y no requerida, propia de un domingo por la tarde, atiende a EL PAÍS. Ha acudido a la capital británica para presentar el informe anual de la institución que ha liderado hasta ahora. Su carrera política y diplomática tiene un bagaje contra el que resulta difícil competir. Ha sido vicepresidenta de Costa Rica y ha estado al frente de la Secretaría General Iberoamericana.

“Si me preguntaras cuál es mi lema de campaña, te diría que es el Artículo 1 de la Carta de Naciones Unidas. Allí se dice todo, y deberíamos ser fieles a esos valores”, defiende. “Pero a la vez tenemos que ser mucho más ágiles y flexibles, más innovadores en las propuestas que la ONU presenta al mundo. Y para eso hay que asumir riesgos”.

“Mantener la paz y la seguridad internacional, fomentar la amistad entre naciones, impulsar la cooperación internacional en la solución de los problemas y centralizar todos esos esfuerzos”, dice ese primer artículo de la Carta de la ONU. Ahí es nada. La economista costarricense se compromete a volver a situar a la organización en el centro del tablero. “En su momento, la organización fue forjada por 50 países. Hoy reúne a 193. Podemos decir entonces que, de alguna manera, hay 143 países que no participaron en esa creación. Esta realidad requiere inclusión”, explica. “Conozco bien Naciones Unidas, tanto como para defenderla y para reformarla”, señala.

Cualquier intento de reafirmar el valor de la institución multilateral por excelencia debe tener en cuenta los constantes desprecios hacia su auctoritas —y hasta su legitimidad— por parte de gobiernos estadounidenses como el de Donald Trump, empeñado en reventar el orden mundial que ha regido las últimas décadas. “Estamos viendo cómo Estados Unidos está comenzando de nuevo a usar Naciones Unidas. Es innegable su cuestionamiento de la institución, pero a la vez decidió elevar hasta el Consejo de Seguridad su plan de paz para Gaza. La frase de Trump en su intervención ante la Asamblea General, cuando señala que la ONU tiene mucho potencial, debe ser tomada en serio (…) Naciones Unidas debe poder estar en las mesas de negociaciones más importantes del mundo, y asumir ese papel con firmeza y determinación”, defiende Grynspan.

Suenan otras candidatas para el puesto de secretaria general de la ONU, como Michelle Bachelet, expresidenta de Chile; Jacinda Ardern, ex primera ministra de Nueva Zelanda; Alicia Bárcena, ministra de Medio Ambiente de México; o Mia Mottley, primera ministra de Barbados.

¿Ha llegado el momento de que una mujer esté al frente de la organización? “Las conozco a todas, y todas tienen un currículum impecable. No tienen ninguna necesidad de un trato especial. Todas tienen los méritos para el puesto, incluyéndome a mí. No pedimos un trato especial, sino que no haya discriminación. Porque si vamos a competir en pie de igualdad, cualquiera de nosotras tiene todas las posibilidades de ganar”, argumenta.

Autoritarismo e inmigración

Grynspan es consciente de que una competición como la que afronta exige evitar pasos en falso. Sus respuestas liman siempre las aristas, mantienen un tono amable y diplomático. Pero eso no significa que estén ausentes de contenido. Tiene un diagnóstico claro frente a fenómenos como el auge del autoritarismo en el mundo. “La democracia está hoy cuestionada porque no puede limitarse a generar la capacidad de un cambio de gobierno. Su legitimidad también reside en la búsqueda de soluciones para los problemas de la mayoría de la población”, defiende esta política de profundas convicciones socialdemócratas.

“Cuando estaba en el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo elaboramos un informe muy famoso en el que se hablaba de la democracia en América Latina, y afirmábamos que había que evitar que el descontento actual ‘en’ la democracia se transformara en un descontento ‘con’ la democracia”, recuerda.

El gran tema de fragmentación de las sociedades occidentales es hoy la inmigración irregular, y Grynspan puede entender la inestabilidad que provoca. Pero recuerda que, como en todo, es importante la perspectiva: “La mayor migración está en el sur”, dice, en referencia a ese término del “sur global” que se utiliza para recordar que el mundo es más amplio que Occidente. “Los mayores focos de concentración están en los países del sur, como Turquía, Líbano o Sudán del Sur […] El objetivo final debe ser que migren solo los que quieren hacerlo, y no los que se ven obligados a hacerlo. Por eso debemos enfocarnos en solucionar las causas estructurales que la impulsan, como el desarrollo de muchos de estos países o el cambio climático”, señala.

Finally, more than 100 days after the start of the U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, Trump has announced his decision to shift from maritime to land attacks. The initial targets, he stated, are in Venezuela, although he also threatened Colombia and any country that produces or traffics drugs. “We’re taking those sons of a bitches out,” he declared, giving his statement the thuggish tone that has become his trademark. And so the crisis reached its highest point of tension. The question is no longer what will happen, but when and how. But, even as a rhetorical exercise, it is still worth asking whether military action against Venezuela and other Latin American countries — whether with troops or surgical strikes — is truly inevitable.

Over the past week, Trump has been dropping hints to let the public know that his administration has made contact with the Nicolás Maduro regime. First, he said he would speak with him; then he revealed that he already had, but downplayed the fact, saying it was just a phone call. However, Reuters reported on Monday night that the conversation took place on November 21 and lasted 15 minutes. The details: Maduro presented a list of demands for stepping down, including a broad amnesty for himself and about 100 of his cronies, as well as an interim government headed by current Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. Trump agreed to allow him and his family to leave the country and gave him a verbal ultimatum to leave Venezuela by November 28, which he failed to do. But he rejected everything else, since defining what can or cannot be granted to Maduro is not within his purview.

What matters is that, from that phone call, Trump’s subsequent statements, and recent developments, five key points emerge that show why the conflict has entered its most critical and dangerous phase yet.

1. A personalized conflict

The power struggle has centered on the two top figures of each government. Despite his recent threats, by downplaying the call, Trump sent a message aimed more at Maduro than at the U.S. public: the channel of negotiation remains open without implying immediate military action, but within a framework of maximum pressure. In chess terms, Trump has essentially put Maduro in check without guaranteeing checkmate. Despite the enormous power imbalance between the two countries, this situation favors Maduro, even though Trump is the one running the clock. As José de Córdoba explained in The Wall Street Journal, at the end of this head-to-head battle, one president will have won and another will have lost. And we know that Trump doesn’t like to lose.

2. The real objective: regime change and controlling the ‘backyard’

Beneath the guise of anti-drug efforts and protecting the U.S. population, Washington’s structural objective is to spark regime change and a transition aligned with the Venezuelan opposition loyal to María Corina Machado. It is, simultaneously, an attempt at geopolitical repositioning by the United States to justify its hegemonic control of its “backyard” — that “little region over here,” as Henry L. Stimson, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of war, called it in 1945. Venezuela operates here as a resource-country: political control, access to strategic assets, and the capacity to project influence vis-à-vis other global actors.

3. War of narratives and fading credibility of the anti-drug message

Since the beginning of the U.S. naval deployment, the accusation that Maduro leads the Cartel of the Suns has been questioned by experts and media, who see it as pretext promoted by Venezuelan opposition members in Washington to facilitate military action.

The recent pardon of Juan Orlando Hernández, the former president of Honduras sentenced to 45 years in prison for collaborating in the shipment of 500 tons of cocaine to the United States, has further undermined the anti-drug narrative, highlighting Trump’s double standards. This strategic contradiction — or blatant inconsistency? — erodes his position at a time when his bombings in the Caribbean face growing opposition from Democrats and Republicans in Congress, segments of the MAGA movement, and the general public.

Two facts are worth highlighting. Only one in five Americans has heard enough about the military deployment in the Caribbean, while 70% of the population would oppose military action. This opposition stems from concerns about violations of international law and potential war crimes associated with the bombing of vessels allegedly carrying drugs. All of this increases the political cost of decisive action just as Trump’s approval ratings are hitting historic lows. By extension, the Venezuelan opposition led by María Corina Machado — which staked its moral and strategic case against Maduro on that narrative but has failed to explain or “sell” it to Americans — is also suffering severe political damage.

4. Media ecosystem and limitations of the US-centric approach

Coverage by media outlets such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, and The Guardian has generated harsh criticism among Venezuelans, who accuse them of “manufacturing a consensus” in favor of Maduro. Although no such campaign exists, there may be anti-Trump biases of varying intensity.

Venezuelans’ frustration is understandable, because this perspective narrows the understanding of the country’s reality: it produces narratives framed from Washington rather than from events on the ground. But it should be recognized rather that we Venezuelans are an interested party, which influences our perception of bias in reports by the mainstream media.

These articles reflect the perspectives of experts and academics who dominate analysis on Venezuela. They reflect professional inertia and editorial agendas geared toward what interests the American professional class, without capturing how Venezuelan society is being strangled by the regime. This reporting overlooks the depth of Chavista corruption and repression, the complicity between its inner circle (Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, Vladimir Padrino López) and criminal networks, Colombian narco-guerrillas, and groups like Hezbollah. This fuels misunderstandings and frustration among opposition members and citizens who yearn for real change.

5. Stalled fleet and the “check without checkmate” strategy

Returning to the fleet: today it symbolizes a frozen check and, for Venezuelans, an interminable wait. The lack of resolution has given Maduro time to promote an epic anti-imperialist narrative, organize his regime’s forces, and improve his negotiating position, while increasing the strain on Trump and a Venezuelan opposition desperate for tangible results. Although Trump has executive power and has demonstrated his willingness to act even outside the legal framework — in fact, he could do so at any moment — he is also moving in a context filled with international crises: the Russia-Ukraine war, global tensions over his tariff policies, a fragile ceasefire in Gaza, and internal resistance to his authoritarian impulses. All of this conditions any decision regarding Venezuela. In this context, isolating the regime will hardly produce a resolution on its own. Without a more decisive gesture from the United States, Maduro will continue to buy time and interpret Trump’s threats as part of the bluffing that characterizes him.

The corollary of this scenario: inaction becomes an action with its own consequences: it perpetuates the crisis, erodes U.S. credibility, and leaves the Venezuelan opposition trapped between expectation and frustration. It is difficult to recommend actions in this context, but if Washington is unclear about its next move, it should take a series of steps. First, assess incentives that would lead to Maduro’s departure and reduce the possibility of armed resistance from Chavismo and its criminal partners in the event of a military intervention. Second, anticipate the human cost of military action, strengthen domestic political support, and avoid mere posturing. Third, bolster non-military alternatives without abandoning military deterrence. In short, avoid mistakes that could prove very costly.

As these factors interact and generate new scenarios that could have unforeseen effects, in Venezuela, narratives about regime change and transition are divided into three groups. First, those who believe that Machado can lead the country to a democratic government under a kind of Trumpian protectorate. Second, the doomsayers who believe that Maduro’s departure would usher in a new era of violence and anarchy, as if Maduro, however much they detest him, were a necessary evil containing even greater chaos. And finally, those who view both narratives with reservations but consider Maduro an illegitimate and corrupt ruler who must leave power as soon as possible. They know that any transition can be turbulent. They know that aligning with Trump carries the enormous risk of entering into a Faustian bargain. But they trust in the majority of Venezuelans’ desire to restore their democracy and peacefully rebuild their future after a quarter-century of Chavista misrule.

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The U.S. Treasury Department announced a new round of sanctions related to Venezuela on Wednesday. Details of these sanctions were published on the official website, accompanied by a message on X. “Today, as part of the Trump administration’s crack down [sic] on international drug trafficking organizations, Treasury has sanctioned key affiliates of the terrorist cartel Tren de Aragua,” the message reads, adding that among those affected by these sanctions is “the entertainer Rosita,” who is described as a “DJ, actress, and a model with millions of social media followers.” She is included in a group of people allegedly “involved in holding drug-fueled parties to benefit” the Venezuelan-based criminal organization.

Washington accuses Jimena Romina Araya Navarro (alias “Rosita”) of being “part of a network of five persons affiliated with the entertainment industry that have provided material support to Tren de Aragua.” She allegedly helped the “notorious head” of the organization, Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (also known as “Niño Guerrero”), “escape from Tocorón prison in Venezuela in 2012.” According to the Treasury’s press release, other members of this network also laundered money for the leaders of the Tren de Aragua.

The U.S. Treasury Department suggests in its statement that Rosita is “romantically linked” to Niño Guerrero.

In addition, the latest round of sanctions targets “five additional key Tren de Aragua affiliates and one entity located in South America.” “Under President Trump, barbaric terrorist cartels can no longer operate with impunity across our borders. The Tren de Aragua network’s narcotrafficking and human smuggling operations have long posed a grave threat to our nation,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in the statement. “At the direction of President Trump, we will continue to use every tool to cut off these terrorists from the U.S. and global financial system and keep American citizens safe.”

The new round of sanctions comes amid an escalating wave of threats from Trump to invade Venezuela to force a change of the Nicolás Maduro regime, which Washington accuses of having ties to the Tren de Aragua criminal network and benefiting from its lucrative crimes. On Tuesday, the U.S. president said: “We’re going to start conducting strikes on land as well. The land targets are much easier, and we know the routes they take. We have extensive knowledge about them.” The goal, after three months of extrajudicial killings in Caribbean waters, he added, is to take out “those sons of a bitches” — referring to the South American country’s drug traffickers. “These people have killed over 200,000 people,” he concluded, exaggerating the official overdose figures for 2024 in the United States.

The Tren de Aragua is a criminal gang of Venezuelan origin that the U.S. State Department included on its list of “foreign terrorist organizations” due to its alleged involvement in criminal activities such as “drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, extortion, sexual exploitation of women and children and money laundering, among others.”

In June, the Treasury Department sanctioned Giovanni Vicente Mosquera Serrano, a high-ranking leader of the Tren de Aragua gang. A month later, they added Niño Guerrero to the list, along with other alleged members of the criminal organization.

According to the accusations outlined by the Treasury in its latest sanctions announcement, “a portion of the revenue generated” by Rosita from her performances “in various nightclubs around Colombia” goes to the Tren de Aragua’s coffers. They specifically point to her connection with the Maiquetía VIP Bar Restaurant in Bogotá, owned by her former bodyguard and manager, Eryk Manuel Landaeta Hernández (aka Eryk).

Eryk was arrested in Colombia in October 2024, accused of being the financial and logistical chief of the Tren de Aragua in Bogotá. “He organized events featuring international artists and DJs, including Rosita. These parties were used to sell narcotics for Tren de Aragua; the proceeds of the drug sales were then laundered,” according to the Treasury Department.

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