U.S. President Donald Trump held a telephone conversation last week with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, The New York Times revealed on Friday. The call, seen as a gesture of rapprochement amid heightened hostilities between the two countries, included the possibility of a future meeting between the two leaders on U.S. soil; if so, it would mark a significant shift in relations between Washington and Caracas. However, according to the newspaper, the meeting has not yet taken place and there are no specific plans for one yet.
The contact comes at a time of heightened political and military tension. The United States has reinforced its presence in the Caribbean, while Venezuela denounces movements it views as a direct threat against its president, Nicolás Maduro. According to The New York Times, the conversation opens the door to a diplomatic path that contrasts sharply with the accusations of drug trafficking against Maduro and his military leadership, or the constant veiled threat of possible U.S. intervention on Venezuelan soil.
That ambiguous announcement—it is unclear how the United States would carry out such a threat—once again highlighted the tension and uncertainty that have marked relations between Caracas and Washington in recent months. The hostility, which is reaching unprecedented levels, has been growing since Maduro remained in power despite doubts about the legitimacy of his reelection after last July’s elections.
Trump maintains his commitment to a growing military presence in the Caribbean with thousands of soldiers, dozens of aircraft, and the deployment of his largest aircraft carrier. Officially, the military mobilization is in response to the fight against drug trafficking, but according to analysts and the tycoon’s own entourage, it has become clear that the ultimate goal is to remove Maduro from power.
It will not be an easy task. Chavismo has responded by deploying its military and training the civilian population to defend themselves against any attack. The message from Maduro and his circle is one of unity and resistance in the face of “imperialism.” For the moment, moreover, there is no evidence of rifts between the military leadership and the regime, one of the objectives that Trump’s strategy is presumably seeking. “We are forced to be united! We cannot fail at this decisive moment for the existence of the Republic,” the Chavista leader cried out on Tuesday at a march that brought together thousands of supporters. “If the homeland calls, the homeland will have our lives if necessary!”
Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition
El venezolano Alfredo Díaz, dirigente político opositor, ex gobernador del estado Nueva Esparta y exalcalde de la ciudad de Porlamar, ha fallecido a los 56 años de un infarto, luego de pasar un año preso en la cárcel de El Helicoide, en Caracas. El partido Acción Democrática, al cual pertenecía, emitió un comunicado en el cual afirma que “su detención se prolongó más de un año de manera injusta y durante ese tiempo no recibió la atención médica que necesitaba”.
El político había sido detenido en noviembre de 2024, cuatro meses después de las elecciones presidenciales, en la ciudad de Ospino, en el estado Portuguesa, mientras intentaba salir de Venezuela. Los familiares de Díaz denuncian que pasó el último año prácticamente incomunicado, salvo por algunas visitas aisladas que le había hecho su hija.
Díaz fue uno de los varios dirigentes opositores que fueron encarcelados tras la ola de detenciones que realizó el chavismo en la segunda parte del año pasado, argumentando el desarrollo de una conspiración para promover la violencia y el caos luego de las elecciones presidenciales en las cuales Nicolás Maduro fue declarado ganador.
Voceros de organizaciones no gubernamentales dentro y fuera del país aseguran que este sería el décimo preso político que muere bajo custodia en las cárceles del chavismo desde las presidenciales. Alfredo Romero, del Foro Penal, afirmó que, en total, 17 presos políticos han muerto en prisión desde 2014.
Díaz, militante del partido Acción Democrática, fue uno de los dirigentes más populares de la Isla de Margarita, -de la cual era oriundo-, uno de los bastiones electorales de la oposición durante las últimas dos décadas. Casado, con dos hijos, se había graduado como técnico en administración de empresas turísticas en la Universidad de Oriente.
En 2008, Díaz fue electo alcalde de la ciudad de Porlamar, capital de la Isla, respaldado por la coalición de partidos opositores de la Mesa de la Unidad Democrática. Consiguió la reelección en 2013.
En 2017, Díaz obtuvo la victoria en los comicios para la gobernación de Nueva Esparta -entidad integrada por Margarita, y las islas menores Coche y Cubagua. Su elección tuvo lugar en medio de un año muy conflictivo, con miles de personas en las calles protestando después de que los poderes públicos chavistas anularan la Asamblea Nacional, que controlaba la oposición, y en la cual había tomado vuelo el discurso de la abstención electoral y el desconocimiento de la legalidad chavista.
Un político de línea moderada, ganado a las salidas políticas y electorales, Díaz había aceptado en 2017 juramentarse ante la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente creada por el chavismo para hacerle sombra al Parlamento que entonces controlaba la oposición. Aquella constituyente no cumplió ningún fin específico, salvo boicotear a la Asamblea Nacional ya existente. Por entonces, el gobierno de Maduro exigió a los gobernadores recién electos, incluyendo a Díaz, que aceptaran a la Constituyente chavista si de verdad querían asumir el poder en sus estados.
Díaz mantuvo algunas relaciones institucionales con la jerarquía chavista durante sus años como gobernador. Fue arrestado luego de participar con las fuerzas opositoras en la campaña electoral del año pasado, cuestionar los resultados de las elecciones y exigir la publicación de los comprobantes electorales.
Hasta la fecha existen, de acuerdo a los datos de la ONG Foro Penal, 884 presos políticos de Venezuela, la cifra más alta de América Latina.
Andrés Orrego saved the man’s number in his cell phone under American Friend. Orrego, who runs a small supermarket in the heart of the northern Colombian town of Yarumal, had liked the foreign stranger’s manners. He made an effort to speak Spanish well, paid in cash with new bills, and was almost always on time. Plus, he bought on a large scale, as if for a crowd: 22 pounds of peanuts, 55 of oranges, 22 of eggplant, 220 of potatoes, 50 coconuts, 75 limes… And then, sure, odder things: a hard-to-find fish, organic wheat flour, pure honey from a specific bloom.
A week after meeting this mysterious man, an incredulous Orrego had to bring his face close to the television screen to believe what it was showing him: that his American friend was the main suspect arrested in an operation carried out against Lev Tahor, the ultra-radical Judaic sect whose leaders have been convicted of abuse and child marriage in the United States. The “Jewish Taliban,” as the group is known, had been looking to settle down in Antioquia, the Colombian department. In Orrego’s town. Next to his supermarket. Colombia, the seventh country through which the group had passed in the last decade, has run into the same difficulties as Mexico and Guatemala once did: it does not know what to do with the sect, nor how to stop it.
The American Friend — whose name has not been disclosed — was the head of a commune with eight other adults and 17 minors. They lived in a truck stop hotel on the outskirts of town. The little girls wore a tunic that covered them from head to foot, similar to a burqa that only revealed their face. Orrego is one of the few residents of Yarumal who got to know the adults, or at least the four who came to his store to shop for groceries. To the rest of the 45,000 inhabitants, they had gone unnoticed. Neither the neighboring merchants, local youth, nor street vendors had seen them in person before the images of the veiled girls and boys with payot were viewed around the world. Though, in reality, they were being watched by many.
Cristian David Céspedes, the mayor of this farming and cattle town, says that ever since they arrived on October 22 from New York, the seven Jewish families had been under investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. Their history had set off alarms. The sect makes children marry each other in order to have the best bloodline possible, to grow the community, the faithful. Though the mayor says they were merely passing through Yarumal, EL PAÍS had access to audiotapes in which two of the group’s leaders asked for help from a merchant to rent a property where they could set up a community.
But those plans fell apart. In a joint operation, authorities from Migration Colombia — the country’s national immigration agency — and the army raided the hotel on the night of November 23, as the group prayed. They had U.S., Guatemalan and Canadian passports, and five of the minors had been subjects of Interpol Yellow Notices, an alert that warns of the disappearance of people who are possible victims of trafficking and kidnapping.
On Monday this week, Colombia expelled nine members of Lev Tahor, who were “handed over to U.S. authorities” according to Gloria Arriero, director of Migration Colombia. The 17 children, who had been staying in a state-run child welfare center since their rescue in November, were placed on the same flight to New York, escorted by Colombian authorities. They were then handed over to child protection services in the United States.
Lev Tahor’s path to Yarumal had been a long one. The sect, with its extensive record of violations of children’s rights, is originally from Israel. Its members emigrated to the United States in the 1980s and continued their journey through Canada, Guatemala and Mexico. They later moved to Iran, where they sought asylum, before crossing the Atlantic again to Colombia. They are not nomads — they are fugitives.
In 2010, two of its leaders were convicted in New York for kidnapping minors, and forcing them to have sex. From then on, they have removed themselves from the rest of the world, and those who have followed their trail say that some members are currently in Turkey, Romania, Moldavia and North Macedonia. No one knows how they pay for their travel, housing, or the dozens of pounds of peanuts and eggplant. They have always accused their detractors of religious persecution. EL PAÍS reached out to two of their leaders, to no response.
An immortal sect
Despite the criminal trail the sect has left across the globe, the Colombian Attorney’s Office has not opened any investigation against them. “[The minors] entered through a normal immigration point, registered, and are with their parents. There are no signs that they were going to be made to have sex for money or enter into a forced marriage, nor did it seem like human trafficking,” say representatives from the Attorney General’s Office.
For 15 years, Orit Cohen has been warning authorities in Israel, Canada and Guatemala that the sect has little to do with Judaism and that it has “destroyed” her family and those of dozens of acquaintance. “It changed our life. There’s proof, there are charges and convictions, but no one has been able to stop them. It’s very painful for me,” she says in a video call from Rishon LeZion in Israel. “They’re a group of pedophiles. What more do they need to stop them?”
Cohen hasn’t been able to see her brother since 2010, when he joined Lev Tahor. Her brother fathered six children, who in turn had five more during the years they spent in Guatemala. Three of Cohen’s nieces and nephews have managed to leave, carrying emotional scars and testimonies of horror: forced marriages, sexual abuse, and psychological manipulation.
“I had a son there, and they don’t let me have any contact with him. When I escaped, I couldn’t save him,” says Israel Amir, one of Cohen’s nephews who spent nearly nine years under the sect’s control in Guatemala. “There was no possible opposition: if someone didn’t agree, they beat them, isolated them or shut them in a kind of cell where no one could speak to them,” Amir recalls. “If anyone tried to go or even think differently, they punished them until they broke.”
Cohen has become the most visible face in the fight against the elusive organization. It’s David and Goliath battle. Although she says she doesn’t trust authorities or those who claim to defend children’s rights in any country, she hopes Israeli courts will grant her custody of her nieces and nephews still under Lev Tahor’s control.
“It’s impossible to guarantee their safety with their parents, no matter what they say, no matter what they regret doing,” she says. “They are Jewish children and the State of Israel is waiting for them.”
Many minors come under control of authorities, but eventually wind up with their parents, as recently happened in Guatemala. In December 2024, the Central American country’s officials rescued 160 children from a settlement, where they found evidence of multiple acts of violence. A year later, only two of the minors remain in the custody of authorities. The others were returned to their parents or to their extended family by court order, despite warnings from Lucrecia Prera, head of the Children’s Ombudsman’s Office. “Many factors kept us from having a clear picture of what we were dealing with. We don’t know if minors died or if there were abortions or children were buried,” she says.
Prera was deeply impacted by the case of a woman in the community who, at 43 years of age, had 17 children. She also remembers the 29 kids with fake names, and the children with malnutrition who had been coached to not say a word, and a box of bones whose origins were never made clear.
“I’m very sorry to say it, but they always look for countries with weak legislation,” says Prera, who continues to wonder who pays for the group’s lawyers and its dozens of trips from one country to another. Those interviewed for this report share the same suspicion: that Lev Tahor is kept afloat by donations from fundamentalist groups.
Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition
Exactly one year ago, in December 2024, Jacobo Reyes León and Jorge Alberts Ponce were feeling pleased with themselves. Business was booming. Reyes oversaw a major diesel-smuggling operation across Mexico’s southern border from Guatemala. Alberts managed contracts at the Cuajimalpa mayor’s office in Mexico City and controlled a series of land invasions in the metropolitan area. The two spoke frequently.
Alberts also ran several security companies and had a well-oiled system for acquiring weapons, licenses, and permits to carry them. Reyes often requested weapons or manpower from him, though sometimes it worked the other way around. They felt powerful. On one occasion, Reyes even said in a phone conversation that the one “who had the balls” now was him. If anyone was in charge, he meant, it was him.
Things only got better for both of them. Reyes and Alberts — who are now accused of organized crime as part of a network linked to the owner of Miss Universe, Raúl Rocha Cantú — managed to close several deals before the end of 2024. On December 17, Alberts told Reyes that the Cuajimalpa mayor’s office, then controlled by Carlos Orvañanos, had awarded him “fumigation” contracts. Alberts added that they were also going to give them “cleaning, security, and were looking into what construction projects they could get.” Reyes replied, “we practically own Cuajimalpa.” The month got even better when, four days later, Reyes managed to acquire a Segurimex security franchise, which would be added to the pair’s growing portfolio.
The branch of the network involving companies in this sector operated in parallel with the main — and perhaps even more profitable — scheme focused on fuel theft (known in Mexico as huachicol). In addition to Segurimex, owned by Reyes, Alberts controlled Servicios Terrestres de Seguridad Privada S.A. DE C.V. (SETER), Servicios Especializados de Investigación y Custodia S.A. de C.V., Servicios Integrales Valbon S.A. DE C.V., and Dinámica Seguridad Privada Consultores S.A. DE C.V. These brands operated as a single entity and concealed a weapons-trafficking operation. The corporate network was connected to other businesspeople in the sector and to a group of intermediaries who helped them obtain firearm permits and licenses. According to conversations collected in the investigation, to which EL PAÍS has had access, this group had the ability to open doors in various government agencies, primarily the Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA), which oversees all matters related to firearms in the country.
The machinations of these companies, orchestrated by Alberts, shed light on an otherwise opaque industry. For years, federal and state agencies contracted with companies in this sector, whose activities have been difficult to trace. One example is Cusaem, which during Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency (2012–2018) obtained contracts with various agencies totaling more than 1 billion pesos ($54.7 million) — a deal that has always been considered suspicious. In one case, Mexico’s now-defunct Federal Police hired its services to guard some of its facilities for three months, paying 801 million pesos ($43.9 million). In a report on that contract, the Superior Audit Office of the Federation concluded that the Federal Police “did not provide proof of the services rendered for which the 801 million pesos were paid.”
On the other hand, public officials with dubious track records — to put it mildly — have also used security companies to conduct business. For example, Hernán Bermúdez, alias Commander H — who was secretary of security in the state of Tabasco from 2018 to 2024 and is now imprisoned for leading a criminal organization, while working with the police — fits this pattern. Years before becoming secretary, Bermúdez, — who reached the post thanks to support of the current Morena party leader in the Senate, Adán Augusto López — created five security companies that secured multimillion-dollar contracts with public agencies, primarily with the Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE) delegation in that state.
The security companies involved in the Miss Universe case reveal the inner workings of the business — its dark, allegedly illegal side. In calls transcribed during the investigation, from late 2024 and early 2025, Reyes and Alberts frequently discuss guns that need to be picked up or sent elsewhere, men required for one company or another, a middleman who manufactures cartridges, and how much they charge to rent firearms and licenses. Sometimes, they also speak with third parties, part of their arms trafficking network, to discuss various aspects of the business. For example, in January, a man named “Omar” asks Reyes, “How much does a license cost with you guys?” Reyes replies that carrying a firearm is 11,000 pesos ($600) per month. Omar responds that it’s expensive, and Reyes, the businessman, says he can offer “380, we have submachine guns and handguns.”
Calls like this were common. On January 9, an unidentified man called Alberts and asked: “How much do six guns for a bodyguard cost?” Alberts replied: “The deposit is 23 pesos [$1.30] per gun, the paperwork is 9,000 pesos [$492] per gun, and the monthly fee is 9,500 pesos [$519].” The caller asked about the types of guns, and Alberts answered: “Glocks, Ceskas, Berettas, Tanfoglios, Mexica, and Mendozas.” Eight days later, another man called Alberts and said he “still needs to finalize the gun deal for Juárez.” Alberts replied: “That’s urgent,” and the other man confirmed, “he also needs to get that sorted out next week.”
The part of the chain that handles licenses and other dealings with authorities also appears in the group’s conversations. On January 21, an unidentified person “came out of a meeting with the Secretariat of Defense to resolve some issue with gun licenses.” This person told Alberts by phone that yes, they would help. Alberts asked him to inform them that by 3:00 p.m. there would be cash because he would meet with the lawyers, and that by 4:00 p.m. he would send it with Basurto, his bodyguard. The person agreed and added: “We need to be ready because then you have to pay the fine and their share,” referring to a possible bribe. Alberts asked how much longer it would take to resolve the issue. The other person replied eight to 15 days, so that the operation is done “properly.” Alberts concluded: “Yes, since they’re giving us weapons again.”
One of the key figures in this part of the scheme is “Captain Julián Cortés,” sometimes called just Capi, or Capi Julián. One day in January, for example, Reyes and Alberts were discussing a shipment of weapons coming from Tijuana. Alberts said: “Sixteen weapons are arriving tonight.” Reyes didn’t comment directly on that but replied that “Captain Julián will give him two [weapons], if he gets a CUIP from Valvon or Seter.” By CUIP, Reyes was referring to the Clave Única de Identificación Permanente (Unique Permanent Identification Number), a number assigned by the National Registry of Public Security Personnel. Valvon and Seter are companies involved in the scheme. When Alberts asked who the weapons were for, Reyes responded: “They’re for his buddy who owns the clothing store in Pachuca.”
Earlier, in December, Alberts and Reyes discussed that a businessman in the sector — mentioned dozens of times in the investigation but not yet charged — and Captain Julián “are the ones who sell the weapons.” In another December call, Capi instructed Alberts on how to open more doors at the Secretariat of Defense: “Normally, in December, SEDENA receives gifts from all the clients, and they take advantage of that to build networks.” Everything is said with complete calm, following the logic Reyes himself expressed: he’s the one in charge now. Sometimes the amount of information they readily share over the phone is astonishing.
Although the situation always seems under control, at times they show some fear that something might get out of hand, or worry about the consequences of a weapons or license sale. On January 6, 2024, Reyes called Alberts and asked if he knows “that the Pakistani guy is bringing only weapons from the Gulf Cartel.” The other doesn’t know what he’s talking about. Reyes grew exasperated: “You set it up! […] They’re the ones working with the Cape,” and told him to search online for “CAPE 25 CARTEL DEL GOLFO” — the alleged code name for the leader of the cartel.
The problem, apparently, was that a collaborator, nicknamed El Loco, who makes R-15 rifle cartridges, was worried about a possible seizure targeting this group. “They all got busted over there, man,” Reyes told Alberts, referring to the seizures in Tamaulipas. Reyes continued: “And your damn licenses went through.” “But from Seter or Seiza?” asked Alberts, questioning whether the weapons came from one of their companies or another. Reyes confirmed that they were from Seter.
There was also troubling information about El Loco. Reyes and one of his subordinates, Daniel Roldán, primarily involved in the fuel-smuggling operation, discussed him in a December conversation. Reyes told Roldán that “El Loco has that thing for making magazines.” He added that he “even makes weapons” and “already has four factories.” Roldán then asked Reyes if he should “give the go-ahead to produce the bullets and magazines, to talk to the SEDENA guy tomorrow.” Reyes replied yes, adding “he has the machines, and mentions that he’s been making about 1,000–1,500 R-15 magazines per week.”
Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition