El presidente cubano, Miguel Díaz-Canel, confirmó en la mañana de este viernes que funcionarios de su Gobierno recién comenzaron las conversaciones con representantes de la administración de Donald Trump, en medio de la debacle económica que atraviesa la isla. Insistió en que ha sido práctica de la Revolución Cubana no “responder a las campañas especulativas sobre este tipo de tema”, tras varias filtraciones que apuntan a que el diálogo, en realidad, ya había comenzado hace semanas. A pesar de que el propio Trump dejó saber en varias ocasiones que estaban conversando con La Habana, la parte cubana mantuvo el silencio, y en ocasiones incluso negó que se estuviese llevando a cabo algún tipo de negociación.

Quince minutos antes de la transmisión que había sido anunciada para las 7:30 (hora de La Habana y de Washington, dos menos en México y cinco más en la España peninsular), la prensa oficialista adelantó que Díaz-Canel, desde la sede del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, en una reunión con miembros del Buró Político, del Secretariado del Comité Central del Partido Comunista, y del Comité Ejecutivo del Consejo de Ministros, dijo que “estas conversaciones han estado orientadas a buscar soluciones, por la vía del diálogo, a las diferencias bilaterales que tenemos entre las dos naciones”. “Hay factores internacionales que han facilitado estos intercambios”, sostuvo.

“En los intercambios que se han sostenido, la parte cubana ha expresado la voluntad de llevar a cabo este proceso, sobre bases de igualdad y respeto a los sistemas políticos de ambos Estados, a la soberanía, y a la autodeterminación de nuestros gobiernos”, dijo el mandatario cubano.

Trump, por su parte, reaccionó al anuncio a eso de las 10:00. Lo hizo en Truth, su red social. No fue esta vez uno de sus hiperbólicos mensajes, sino que se limitó a retuitear un artículo del diario USA Today, cuyo titular dice: “Cuba confirma las conversaciones con los funcionarios estadounidenses, lo cual acrecienta la esperanza de un acuerdo”. Ese mismo periódico publicó el domingo pasado una información que hablaba de la inminencia de un pacto económico, aunque no daba más detalles sobre su contenido. No obstante, deslizó que el plan de la Casa Blanca era quitar del medio a Díaz-Canel, pero mantener en la isla a los herederos del apellido Castro.

El mensaje de Díaz-Canel se ha emitido en medio de una histórica crisis económica y mientras La Habana se mantiene bajo una presión creciente por parte de Estados Unidos. Horas antes de esta comparecencia, el Gobierno cubano anunció la liberación de 51 presos por mediación del Vaticano. “Es una práctica soberana, nadie nos la impone”, dijo este viernes Díaz-Canel. “Responde a nuestra vocación humanista”. No queda claro, hasta el momento, si las decenas de presos por liberar incluyen a algunos de los más de 1.000 presos políticos que permanecen en las cárceles cubanas. Desde ya, la ciudadanía exige que cualquier acuerdo con Washington debe contemplar la amnistía para los presos de conciencia.

Después de 12 años del anuncio del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas por Barack Obama y Raúl Castro en diciembre de 2014, esta es la primera vez que el Gobierno cubano se sienta con su contraparte estadounidense, en aras de llegar a un acuerdo. Si en aquella ocasión el llamado fue a través del soft power (poder blando), con énfasis en el engagement (compromiso o involucramiento) entre ambos pueblos, hoy a Cuba no le ha quedado más remedio que transar con los estadounidenses, que le han puesto la soga al cuello tras la emergencia nacional decretada el pasado 29 de enero, que privó al país del combustible que llegaba de manos de Venezuela o México.

“Hace más de tres meses que no entra un barco de combustible en el país. Estamos trabajando en unas condiciones muy adversas, con un impacto inconmensurable en la vida de todo nuestro pueblo”, sostuvo. Ciertamente, esta es una situación que ha paralizado la vida en general, con la suspensión de escuelas, el escaso transporte, los largos apagones. Desde hace una semana, los cubanos se unen cada noche en cacerolazos a modo de protesta por una situación que se les hace insostenible.

En la aparición de Díaz-Canel de este viernes, llamó la atención, particularmente, la presencia de Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, nieto de Raúl Castro, conocido como El Cangrejo. El coronel de 41 años es quien, presuntamente, está manteniendo conversaciones con el secretario de Estado, el cubanoamericano Marco Rubio, en quien Trump ha depositado la misión del futuro de Cuba, un territorio que el político de Florida conoce bien.

Aunque aún es una incógnita qué clase de temas están abordando La Habana y Washington, los primeros pasos de un posible deshielo parecen haber comenzado ya. Los permisos para que el sector privado importe petróleo a Cuba directamente desde Estados Unidos, los constantes comentarios de Rubio sobre la importancia de un cambio económico en la isla y la excarcelación ahora de decenas de presos podrían dar indicios de lo que se está abordando en la negociación entre ambos países. Cuando en 2014 los entonces presidentes de ambos países anunciaron el restablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, el deshielo también llegó de la mano de ciertas aperturas para el sector privado y la liberación de 53 presos, también por mediación del Vaticano.

Aunque hay muchas similitudes entre ambas políticas, los expertos también hablan de marcadas diferencias entre Obama y Trump respecto al acercamiento con Cuba. “La administración Obama intentó normalizar las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, sin derrocar al régimen de La Habana. En cambio, la segunda administración Trump se ha centrado en impulsar un cambio en el liderazgo cubano y lograr reformas económicas en la isla”, dijo a EL PAÍS Jorge Duany, exdirector del Instituto Cubano de Investigaciones y catedrático emérito de la Universidad de Florida. “Mientras Obama adoptó una retórica conciliadora hacia Cuba, Trump ha insistido en la confrontación con el régimen socialista. Obama facilitó los viajes y el comercio entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, buscando sustituir el aislamiento por el engagement. Por su parte, Trump 2.0 ha aplicado una política de máxima presión y asfixia económica para precipitar la caída del gobierno cubano”.

La aparente cordialidad del diálogo

Sin entrar en especificidades ni muchos más detalles sobre las conversaciones con la Casa Blanca, el mandatario cubano dijo que se trata “un proceso muy sensible, que se conduce con seriedad y responsabilidad, porque afecta los vínculos bilaterales entre las dos naciones y demanda enormes y arduos esfuerzos para encontrar solución y crear espacios de entendimiento, que nos permitan avanzar y alejarnos de la confrontación”.

En todo momento, Díaz-Canel trató de transmitir cordialidad entre las negociaciones con Washington. Incluso habló sobre el ataque a una lancha de exiliados cubanos el pasado 25 de febrero, que se pensó podía desatar la ira de Washington, pero que ha resonado con poca fuerza en la Casa Blanca.

La embestida dejó el saldo de cuatro personas fallecidas y seis heridos, quienes se acercaban a las costas de Villa Clara desde Florida, y que fueron atacados por los Guardacostas cubanos. Se trató de una “infiltración armada con fines terroristas”, “financiada desde territorios de EEUU”, dijo el mandatario. “En las investigaciones todos han reconocido su participación, que fueron ellos los primeros que dispararon contra nuestra embarcación de Guardacostas”, sostuvo. También aseguró que los heridos han recibido la debida atención médica y que los cadáveres fueron reconocidos por sus respectivos familiares. No obstante, hasta el momento varios familiares han afirmado no haber recibido información alguna de parte del Gobierno cubano.

El mandatario dijo que la Casa Blanca ha estado informada del incidente, que implicó a dos ciudadanos estadounidenses. “Han agradecido la información que se les ha dado. Han planteado su disposición de participar de conjunto en el esclarecimiento de los hechos”, sostuvo. Incluso dejó saber que están a la espera de expertos del FBI que participarán de las investigaciones junto a las fuerzas del Ministerio del Interior cubano.

El discurso, que desde bien temprano del viernes esperaban los cubanos tanto dentro como fuera del país, se presentó por el Gobierno como una continuación de la comparecencia del 5 de febrero, cuando Díaz-Canel dejó claro que “Cuba está dispuesta a un diálogo con Estados Unidos”. “Hay muchas cosas en las que podemos trabajar juntos, sin prejuicios”, insistió entonces.

Cuba, el próximo objetivo de Trump

Han pasado 43 días desde que la Administración de Trump declaró la emergencia nacional hacia la isla. Desde entonces, la vida en el país, que ya era precaria, se ha vuelto mucho más insostenible. Esa presión es parte, al parecer, del plan que tienen Trump y Rubio, quien ha dicho que, antes cualquier libertad política, Cuba necesita regenerar su economía.

Trump, a quien se le ha pedido un posicionamiento directo respecto a Cuba luego de la intervención en Venezuela, promete que la isla verá un cambio antes de fin de año. La imprevisibilidad de la guerra en Irán lanzada con Israel amenaza con enlentecer el avance de sus prioridades, pero incluso en mitad de un conflicto que cada día está un poco más fuera de control, Trump no ha dejado de girarse hacia la isla.

La última vez que se refirió a Cuba fue el sábado pasado, durante la presentación en su hotel del Doral (Florida) del llamado Escudo de las Américas, una alianza de Gobiernos latinoamericanos ideológicamente afines para combatir el narcotráfico. En ese foro, el presidente de Estados Unidos, que a menudo vincula el porvenir de La Habana con la experiencia personal de alguien que ha convivido con “ese problema desde pequeño”, afirmó que espera “con muchas ganas el gran cambio que pronto llegará a Cuba”. En el caso de Rubio, se trata de algo personal: el secretario de Estado es hijo de inmigrantes cubanos y producto del anticastrismo más convencido de Miami.

Fuel shortages continue to take their toll on a Cuba on the brink, where with each passing day, more reasons for discontent grow. The residents of the capital, more powerless than determined because they see no end to their precarious situation, have once again taken to their pots and pans to protest the prolonged power outages. Last week, blackouts hit Havana neighborhoods particularly hard — in the rest of the country, the outages have been exceeding 24 hours for some time now — alternating between about four hours of electricity and some 15 hours without. “No one can work, study, or be happy like this,” says Leandro Fernández, a young student at the University of Havana who lives in the Cerro neighborhood. He speaks, pot in hand, faithful to a custom he adopted a week ago, along with other residents, at around 9:30 p.m., when it’s now common for them to have been without electricity for about 13 hours.

Just like on Leonardo Street, other Havana neighborhoods have taken the same action, and the sound of banging pots and pans can be heard in areas of Central Havana, San Miguel del Padrón, La Lisa, and other parts of the city, almost like a cry, a catharsis, a wake-up call amid the collapse of a country plunged into darkness. More than a month after the start of the U.S. oil embargo against the island, and given the Cuban authorities’ inability to maintain certain services, such as transportation and open universities, that would guarantee the normal flow of life, people are finding ways to demand solutions and be heard, whether by reflecting in a critical Facebook post, banging pots and pans, or organizing an independently structured university assembly to try to unblock the precarious functioning of Cuban education, especially in the last month, where classes have been taught through WhatsApp groups and online platforms.

This is an open debate to “seek structural reforms in higher education,” promoted autonomously by a group of students who have called themselves University Sit-in and who the previous day starred in an unusual event, dealing with forms of collective organization, outside the control of the Cuban authorities, to expose problems in the university community.

Nearly 30 students from various faculties attended the demonstration, and their voices were finally heard by the officials in charge, amid a deployment of State Security agents, the repressive apparatus of the Cuban government.

A month after the implementation of the hybrid learning model that students and professors have been forced into, with classrooms closed and with the memory of student protests against the price hikes by Etecsa — the country’s only telecommunications company, which raised connectivity prices last June — still fresh, the collective strain is evident. But the final straw was last week’s massive call by the Federation of University Students (FEU) for students, unable to attend classes, to take on essential tasks for local authorities in their municipalities, such as garbage collection, hospital cleaning, or teaching in primary schools. The discontent was widespread, and the responses from FEU representatives were inadequate.

“This motivated us to take action,” says a communications student who participated in the peaceful sit-in on the university steps and preferred to remain anonymous. When she arrived on Monday morning, there were already about 15 students gathered at the base of the steps. From that moment, the young woman recounts, several professors were already talking with the group about their demands and trying to “persuade us to move to a less public place,” away from the foreign press present. As the number of students increased, “the atmosphere began to change.” More university officials and plainclothes officers appeared, preventing new protesters from entering, while the group already on the steps spoke with the academic authorities. “I realized we were being surrounded by state security. It was intimidating,” she recalls.

The protesters brought purely academic demands and denounced, the young woman recounts, the lack of support from their FEU representatives and the attempts made to delegitimize the protest. They spoke about practical issues hindering normal access to education in the country at this time, the proposal for community service, “which should not be a substitute for university time,” and the uncertainty imposed by the blended learning model. “The education we are receiving is quite mediocre, despite the efforts of students and professors,” protests the student, who has had to spend extra money on internet access to complete her online assignments and, along with her classmates, is demanding changes to how the semester will continue. “The authorities aren’t giving us a clear date for a return to normalcy.”

What happened this Monday on the steps of the University of Havana carries a unique symbolism, as it highlights the community’s discontent with the organization that represents them, the Federation of University Students, which has been delegitimized by its ambiguous role in responding to the Etecsa rate hike, a move that provoked widespread rejection and protests from the university community. “We made it clear that we will not tolerate being ignored, nor the bureaucratic processes that prevent us from resolving our problems,” stated the young woman, who sees this peaceful sit-in as the beginning of a path toward independent organization and the demand for rights.

The truth is that, whether it’s a university sit-in or the pot-banging protests in Havana’s neighborhoods, the discontent of Cubans, exhausted within the island, is beginning to take shape.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition

Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, summed up the world order in which Russia, deep down, has always believed with a single sentence last week. “We should probably secure benefits for ourselves where possible, no matter how cynical that may sound,” the high-ranking official said, in total contradiction to the Kremlin’s recently promoted narrative of a new multipolar world in opposition to the West. Venezuela, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey, for example, are partners in BRICS (the bloc of emerging economies comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others) and are now attacking each other or being bombed by Washington amid Russian indifference. “This is not our war,” added the Kremlin spokesman, while Moscow’s offensive against Ukraine has received a financial boost thanks to the new international energy crisis unleashed by U.S. President Donald Trump, Putin’s “frenemy.”

It’s risky to predict that Russia will emerge victorious from the U.S.-Israeli offensive against Iran. While the recent surge in oil prices has bolstered the Russian budget, beyond the Kremlin’s calculations, in the long run it could trigger a global recession or strengthen the ruble, further stifling Russian companies that have barely managed to survive until now.

Moscow has received an unexpected injection of dollars by selling off its sanctioned oil, but its international alliances, which the Kremlin had coveted for so many years, are being shaken by the Trump administration. In the Middle East, the future of the Iranian regime is uncertain; in Latin America, Cuba is in danger and the Venezuelan government has shifted toward the U.S. orbit; and in Asia, China is watching events closely. President Xi Jinping will meet with Trump in April, and one of the points they will negotiate, according to The Wall Street Journal, is that Beijing buy less crude oil from Russia.

Furthermore, while the role of hydrocarbons in warfare is significant, it is not decisive. Russia is not “a gas station masquerading as a country,” as Republican Senator John McCain said a decade ago. Of the 40.2 trillion rubles (around $505 billion) in revenue that the Kremlin projects in its budget for this year, 8.9 trillion would come from gas and oil.

The White House tightened the screws on the Russian oil industry last fall for its refusal to make concessions in the Ukraine negotiations, and has now loosened them as it needs to contain crude oil prices due to its own aggression in the Middle East. The U.S. Treasury Department has allowed Indian refineries to buy the crude that Russia’s shadow fleet had been storing offshore because it couldn’t find buyers due to the sanctions. However, Washington is only allowing this until early April.

The Iranian conflict has caused a sudden increase in hydrocarbon prices, but nothing excessive enough for Russian coffers to be overflowing with rubles as in 2022, when Moscow invaded Ukraine and the fear of running out of gas led European countries to buy it at exorbitant prices.

Brent crude was trading around $90 a barrel on Tuesday, 25% higher than before the U.S. intervention. “Current prices are within their historical range,” said Javier Blas, Bloomberg’s energy columnist, in an email exchange.

The expert emphasizes that the markets have absorbed this conflict much better than they did the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Back then, Brent crude reached $130 per barrel for several days, and the most important electricity contract in Germany was trading at €1,000 ($1,160) per megawatt-hour, compared to the current €85 ($98.6). “Sometimes we forget the magnitude of the crisis three years ago,” he recalls.

However, Blas believes that Russia will be one of the biggest beneficiaries of this crisis for two reasons. The first is that India and other countries “urgently need to replace the crude oil they can no longer buy in the Persian Gulf.” New Delhi, which imported 2.1 million barrels of Russian oil per day in mid-2025, was buying only 1.1 million barrels per day in January of this year due to the new U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, the largest Russian oil companies. In fact, Trump managed to get India to agree to buy more U.S. crude.

The second reason, according to Blas, is that Moscow will no longer need to offer its enormous discounts to attract customers. Days before Trump launched his campaign against Tehran, Russian oil companies were offering their biggest discount in three years to attract buyers willing to take the risk: $30 off the average market price. While Brent crude was trading at just over $70 a barrel in February, it was selling for around $40 at the ports of Novorossiysk and Primorsk, according to the energy consultancy Argus Media.

Blas, co-author of the book The World For Sale, points out that not only India, but also China and Turkey, will take advantage of this window of opportunity to buy Russian oil. “Washington and Brussels will look the other way,” the analyst opines.

The “economy of death”

The Kremlin calculated a price of $59 per barrel for Russian oil for its accounts this year and has watched with satisfaction as other countries have rushed to its floating reserves even without a discount.

The problem is that the state budget isn’t everything. Russia is mired in a visible economic crisis, and the civilian sector is in shambles. The state continues to channel almost all its resources toward the arms industry and the military, competing with companies that generate economic value and consumption, which are operating at a loss, and poaching their staff while thousands of working-age men continue to die on the front lines.

Among Russian economists, there is talk of the “Dutch Disease,” similar to what happened to the Spanish Empire with gold from the Americas. In the 1960s, the Netherlands discovered large natural gas deposits. The massive influx of foreign currency strengthened the guilder, a curse that led to the ruin of the rest of the export industries.

The war against Ukraine is consuming around 40% of the Russian budget, and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced further cuts just before the Iran conflict to replenish the resources of the National Investment Fund, the Kremlin’s anti-crisis parachute that also serves to control the ruble.

The crisis unleashed by Trump could also be a double-edged sword if it leads to a global recession, according to analyst Nick Trickett in an article published by the think tank Ridl. Russia is a hydrocarbon-exporting country, and the trade war could trigger an international crisis if it drags on, reducing its sales. China has cut its growth forecast below 5%, U.S. bond markets are not showing much confidence in a recovery from this crisis, and the European optimism sparked months ago by German fiscal stimulus has crumbled.

Furthermore, since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has been forcing its companies to convert their foreign currency earnings into rubles. Rising oil prices could further strengthen an already strong ruble, hindering industrial competitiveness and budget revenues, while simultaneously increasing the cost of all raw materials, which would exacerbate already runaway domestic inflation and potentially trigger interest rate hikes, further burdening households and businesses already enduring a significant economic crisis.

In any case, Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev warned last year that Putin had room to continue his war throughout 2026, even if it further impoverished the population. “Despite the lack of significant progress on the front lines, Putin wants to keep fighting. There is money for war, there always will be,” the expert sighed on the other end of the phone.

The analyst also observes another possible scenario that would harm the Kremlin. “In March and April we will see an increase in Russian budget revenues from oil and gas, but I insist, it won’t be double; it will be an increase of 25%, 30%, perhaps 40%, but that’s the maximum. And then I am convinced that the situation will normalize,” he states.

“A defeat for Iran would likely change the oil market. It won’t just mean more supply. Iran was a major risk factor for the entire region, and if it disappears, the feeling that oil needs to be expensive because something might happen there will vanish. Crude oil prices will be significantly lower by the end of the year than they are now, and the Russian problem is unlikely to have been resolved by then,” he adds.

Inozemtsev coined the term smertonomika, the “economy of death” in Russian. Following the traumatic military mobilization of 2022, Putin opted for the recruitment of volunteers with exorbitant payments. At the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, a professional soldier cost the state around 45,000 rubles a month ($580 at the time) with a death benefit of five million rubles (just under $70,000) for the family. Last year, a volunteer signing their first contract with the army received 215,000 rubles a month (around $2,670), plus a recruitment bonus of up to 3.5 million rubles (around $46,380) and a death benefit payment to the family of between 12 and 16 million rubles ($150,750 to $203,000).

These are staggering figures for a country where the average salary is 73,400 rubles (about $930) a month. And yet, they are falling short: inflation has narrowed the wage gap with other jobs, the pool of recruits is dwindling — to older people, indebted, with criminal records and without education, that is, “not integrated into the productive economy” — and numerous regions have begun to increase payments even further as the influx of volunteers dries up.

A report by the Case Center, The Price of Life, estimates that the Russian state will have to double or triple payments to keep up with the pace of recruitment demanded by the Ministry of Defense.

In this situation, Inozemtsev points out that the only way for the Russian government to continue with its plans is through devaluation, not through the inflow of extra income from oil and gas, even if this worsens inflation and hits the population even harder.

“All the crises that Russia has experienced — in 1998, 2008, 2009, and 2015 — were always accompanied by a significant devaluation. This is the first time that the economy is doing poorly, the budget is very tight, and the ruble has strengthened by more than 30% in the last year; it’s an impossible scenario,” the economist opines.

The Russian currency is currently trading at 92 rubles per euro and 79 rubles per dollar, whereas the budgets were prepared using an exchange rate of 92.2 rubles per dollar. “Either the central bank combats inflation or they fear social unrest, but it is a factor that weakens the economy. Realistically, the exchange rate should be significantly closer to 100 rubles per dollar,” Inozemtsev warns.

The Russian statistics agency, Rosstat, reports that 2025 ended with an inflation rate of 5.9%. However, many Russian economists point to rates exceeding 12%, and a report from the Central Bank of Russia indicates that the population anticipated a 14.5% price increase last year. And 2026 has begun with a widespread tax hike, the first step in the new direction set by the Kremlin: Russians must make a much greater sacrifice for their war.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition