With less than five months until midterm elections that will shape the second half of Donald Trump’s term, the old dilemma tearing the Democratic Party apart has resurfaced. The victory on Tuesday of the three candidates backed by New York’s left-wing mayor Zohran Mamdani has raised alarm in the party’s centrist wing, which fears heading into November 3 with candidates seen as too radical and therefore easy targets for Republican attacks.

Mamdani took a considerable risk by explicitly backing Brad Lander, Claire Valdez and Darializa Avila Chevalier—through television ads and joint appearances—against the party’s wishes. All three surprisingly defeated establishment heavyweights on Tuesday. The success of his gamble gives the mayor a substantial injection of political capital he intends to exploit.

“The old politics that got us to this crisis is not the politics that is going to get us out of this crisis,” Mamdani declared on Tuesday to an enthusiastic base. “New Yorkers are hungry for a new kind of politics,” he repeated on Wednesday. The message is clear: old dogmas—whether on the U.S. relationship with Israel or on fighting inequality—are no longer valid.

“Rather than reopening the battle among Democrats, I think Mamdani’s victory, in a way, closes it. Progressives have won. The party is now theirs. It’s clear which way the wind is blowing,” says Lincoln Mitchell, a professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. The political scientist argues the takeaway is that Democrats must change their mindset and stop fielding mediocre candidates just because they have held office for a long time. He insists voters will no longer accept candidates who, for example, hesitate to raise taxes on billionaires.

After these primaries, it is almost a certainty that Lander, Valdez and Avila Chevalier will get seats in the House. Although the midterms are on November 3, all three ran in New York districts with strong Democratic majorities, so that winning the primary effectively amounts to winning the seat.

The significance goes beyond New York. The three politicians share much in common: they belong to the party’s furthest-left wing and hold very critical views of Israel and of unconditional U.S. support for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.

The steady shift of Democratic sympathizers toward pro-Palestinian positions foreshadows a seismic movement in a party long assumed to be allied with Israel. “The party’s centrist wing has adopted a stance on Israel that, frankly, is disconnected from reality. If you are [California governor] Gavin Newsom, you should be mindful that your position on Israel could cost you the election,” Professor Mitchell adds.

Another sign from these primaries is the growing importance of the socialist movement—a word that was until recently taboo in the United States. Valdez and Avila Chevalier, like Mamdani himself, are members of the Democratic Socialists of America. Lander, who is Jewish, was a member of that organization until he left it in 2023 after Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7 of that year. The House that emerges from the midterm elections will have twice as many socialist members, rising from two to four. It is another indicator of the new times in Washington.

Republicans’ response

Meanwhile, Republican rivals are already taking note. Donald Trump was the first. The U.S. president spent Wednesday morning posting on his social network Truth, warning of the alleged danger posed by those he calls communists. For example: “America The Beautiful will NEVER be a communist country!!!”

He also reacted, with a hint of envy, to press coverage of Mamdani’s clear success: “Mayor Mamdani pulled through 3 solid Communists, and has received loud and universal applause from the Fake News Media. I went 16-0 last night, helping to elect wonderful American Patriots, and the Media doesn’t say a word.”

In the coming campaign, in addition to stoking many Americans’ fear of socialist policies, Republicans will be able to use past remarks by the Democrats. For example, Avila Chevalier recently deleted tweets in which she criticized then-Vice President and presidential candidate Kamala Harris. “Fuck Kamala Harris,” she wrote.

She also deleted messages in which she spoke of abolishing the police, prisons and borders, of nationalizing major industries, and in which she questioned Israel’s right to exist. Avila Chevalier has apologized for these comments, saying they do not reflect her current views. But that will not prevent Republicans from using them not only in her New York district but across the United States.

The arrival of these candidates in the Capitol could also spell trouble for current House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries, who hopes to become speaker if his party regains the majority in November. The party’s left wing has been highly critical of Jeffries’ opposition to the Trump administration, which could complicate his bid.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition

Francisco Blanch acknowledges that he has been on edge for nearly four months. The Madrid-born head of global commodities and derivatives at Bank of America has been on the front line of the energy shock triggered by the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and now that Washington and Tehran have begun negotiations toward a final peace deal, he is optimistic. He notes that the economy has weathered the blow well — “it’s in fairly good shape, despite everything that has happened” — and even believes oil demand will emerge stronger in the medium term, despite geopolitical risks, as reserve buffers and consumption adjustments have proven effective in preventing an energy collapse. Above all, he is confident that normality will return to Hormuz by the end of the year, given that both the United States and Iran need this to happen and that Trump had no appetite to take things further.

Question. What is your current forecast for oil prices this year?

Answer. We revised our forecasts at the start of the war, when we raised our estimate to an average of $92.5 per barrel of Brent crude this year. And we lowered it last week to an average of $82. Prices skyrocketed at first, but then the United States eased sanctions on Russia, and there was no attempt to cut off the flow of Iranian oil during the first weeks of the war, which eased tensions somewhat. The release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves was also announced, and another 300 million barrels of sanctioned oil were available at sea. And of course, there has also been some reduction in demand — that’s how we’ve more or less managed to get by over the last four months.

Q. When will supply recover to the point where supply and demand are in balance?

A. Inventories are falling and will continue to fall very rapidly in the coming months, but we think we’ll likely see a balanced market by the fourth quarter. Not yet in the third quarter; supply is only just beginning to flow through the Strait. This Monday, three large Iranian tankers, each carrying two million barrels, were passing through the Strait of Hormuz bound for Asia, and demand is recovering. But it will still take some time to reach that balance, because over the summer we’ll face a massive bottleneck at various points along the Strait. All the sea mines must be cleared, and transit capacity is currently limited. We expect that 40% of traffic will likely be restored by the end of July, 75% by the end of September, and the remainder by the end of the year.

Q. Are you confident that the Strait of Hormuz will return to complete normalcy? What if the conflict resumes?

A. Our forecast is for an average of $82 this year, based on the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz will fully reopen and that in the second half of the year, prices will be closer to the $70–$80 range. There is a risk that the conflict could return, because we’re talking about 60 days of negotiations. By September, when that deadline would have expired, as many as 65 ships a day could already be passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps military tensions will continue, but we believe the most reasonable scenario is that there will be an increase in oil supply. Things will return to normal because it’s in the interest of both Iran and the United States. In the U.S., public opinion is not in favor of the conflict. I think Trump has reached his limit and stopped there. And in a way, it’s not that surprising: the scenario was never that this war would last six years, or even six months. The most reasonable assumption is that we’ll see more and more ships crossing the Strait, but probably without reaching 100% of normal levels even during a good season.

Q. Iran has shown the world that it can close the Strait of Hormuz. Will there be a risk premium on crude oil?

A. Compared to the situation at the beginning of the year, certainly. And oil inventories need to be replenished. The U.S. has its lowest strategic crude oil reserves in decades, and replenishing them won’t be a quick process; it will be an additional factor driving demand. China will also have to replenish its reserves; I don’t think this will be a factor that drives prices higher, though it will provide some support. The country was very well prepared and has managed the situation very well to avoid supply shortages: China’s inventory levels are still higher than they were before the war. It buys when oil is cheap and stops buying when it’s expensive.

Q. And when will we see a return to the pre-war oil production surplus? The International Energy Agency forecasts a significant surplus by 2027.

A. Yes, there will be a surplus in 2027; the question is how much. We think it will be close to one million barrels per day, depending on what OPEC does, on production in the United Arab Emirates, on how Iran behaves, on the extent of damage in the region, on whether we face any transit issues in the Strait of Hormuz again, and on whether China returns to the market… But in principle, there will be a surplus because we had one before the war, and a large portion of the volume that has been lost will be recovered.

Q. How do you expect OPEC and the UAE to contribute to that surplus? Will they be able to ramp up their oil production to quickly make up for what they’ve lost?

A. They will play an important role, but we also have to ask ourselves how cheap that oil supply will be. Four months ago, it was the cheapest energy in the world, but today the same cannot be said. We don’t know whether there will be a toll imposed by Iran or not; defense spending by the Gulf countries is going to increase considerably, and they will have to invest heavily in repairs and in alternative supply routes and storage facilities. The Gulf countries are going to have to focus more on their local economies.

Q. What long-term effects do you think this war might have on oil demand? Will the adoption of alternative energy sources to oil and gas accelerate?

A. It’s true that we need to reach a price level that makes oil an attractive fuel again. Global energy demand is very strong right now; the economic transformation driven by artificial intelligence requires chips and energy. Electric utilities are terrified by the demand for capacity driving investments by hyperscalers. AI and electric vehicles won’t lead to lower energy consumption — data usage is enormous. I believe that, comparatively speaking, the price of oil isn’t particularly high. Over the past four months, we’ve experienced the largest disruption in oil production in history, and absolutely nothing has happened. Some countries in Southeast Asia have had to adjust their demand, but overall there has been neither a global recession nor completely out-of-control energy prices. Quite the contrary — we’ve been able to manage the situation through reserves, adjustments, and flexibility in a truly surprising way, to the point where I believe this could be positive for demand for hydrocarbons in the medium term.

Q. Do you think the United States has emerged stronger from the war, at least as the world’s leading crude oil producer?

A. Yes, because in the end, you still need the missile defense shield in Qatar, but not off the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The United States has not cut back on its export levels at any point over the past four months. We can’t live without U.S. oil; it produces nearly as much as used to pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily — about 21 million barrels a day, which is 20% of global production. And nearly a third of liquefied natural gas production. The U.S. needs a market with prices that allow it to produce that oil, and that’s something we have to take into account as well. If Brent crude falls back to $60 or $65 per barrel, we’ll see a repeat of what happened at the beginning of the year: U.S. production, which had been rising, will decline.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition