Last Friday, an operation was carried out against alleged members of the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla organization in the Venezuelan state of Apure, near the border with Colombia. In the absence of official confirmation, human rights organizations working in the area, such as Fundaredes, reported at least 20 deaths. On Tuesday, The New York Times revealed that the United States participated in the strike, carried out with drones, in a direct offensive against the irregular Colombian groups that for years have established operations in Venezuela amid inaction by the authorities.
According to four U.S. officials quoted by the newspaper, the operation took place last Friday with U.S. intelligence and drone support. A senior Venezuelan military officer also confirmed the attack. Residents in Puerto Páez, an area controlled by the ELN, described a bombing, and photographs of some of the dead circulated in WhatsApp groups. Local reporters from Alianza Rebelde Investiga were able to identify eight of the dead, including two Colombians and four Mexicans, using information gathered from the morgue, the hospital, and San Fernando de Apure cemetery, around 250 miles from Caracas. Fundaredes, the first organization to raise the alarm, counted 23 dead and an undetermined number of wounded in attacks on an ELN base used as a cocaine distribution center, according to testimony the Times collected from survivors and local residents.
If confirmed, it would mark the second operation of this type, after an airstrike in June that killed the leader of the Tren de Aragua criminal organization, Héctor Guerrero Flores, aka “Niño Guerrero,” in the gold mines of Bolívar state, as Donald Trump claimed on his social media the day after local residents reported security operations in the area. The joint operation highlights how since last year the Trump administration has deployed a militarized strategy against drug trafficking in Latin America. Attacks on vessels off the coasts of Venezuela and Colombia have escalated to ground operations. The New York Times also revealed that Washington and Caracas were evaluating the possibility of deploying U.S. troops in Venezuela, as part of the tutelage the United States has exercised since January 3, when it captured former president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.
Venezuelan authorities have not reported on the incident. The interior and justice minister, Diosdado Cabello, merely said he had deployed the scientific police to the area to investigate some “strange deaths.” He also announced the dispatch of troops to the border with Colombia, in response to the militarization of the Norte de Santander department ordered by Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella. “We do not want internal conflicts in Venezuela, especially those that are not ours,” Cabello said.
In recent years the ELN has been withdrawing into Venezuela. According to investigative reporting, it has between 900 and 2,000 fighters in at least 38 border municipalities in the states of Apure, Amazonas, Táchira, and Zulia, where it controls clandestine airstrips for drug trafficking and is also involved in fuel and mineral smuggling and extortion. For years the chavista regime was accused of sheltering ELN guerrillas and dissidents who broke away from the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC on its territory, although the government has always denied it.
FARC dissident groups have also penetrated some territories, and in 2021 Maduro’s government launched an operation against the guerrillas that displaced more than 5,000 people to Arauca, Colombia. Venezuelan authorities then fought groups from the defunct FARC who were contesting territory with the ELN, against whom they had so far avoided taking action. During that incident, one of the most serious in recent years, activist Javier Tarazona of Fundaredes was detained over his complaints about the presence of irregulars; he was released this year amid the political opening forced by the United States.
In the criminal indictment Maduro now faces in a New York court he is accused of being an ELN ally in the smuggling of cocaine to the United States. The ELN has also been accused of controlling mines in Venezuela’s south and of operating as an armed group allied with the Armed Forces to confront other criminal organizations, according to reports by the International Crisis Group.
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En el centro de la pelea entre el Gobierno de Abelardo de la Espriella y la oposición de izquierdas hay una nueva denuncia de corrupción que, esta vez, está ligada a la vida íntima del expresidente Gustavo Petro. Presidencia ha denunciado que el exmandatario ofreció contratos públicos durante su mandato a más de 40 mujeres a cambio de relaciones sexuales, una acusación que aún está por probar. Pero el tono de la denuncia, desde el primer día, no se ha limitado a la legalidad de sus acciones, pues ha llegado a la moralidad en su vida privada.
“Le vamos a demostrar al pueblo colombiano cómo, lamentablemente, la Casa de Nariño fue armada, organizada y confeccionada para otra cosa diferente: no a gobernar, sino a todos los días parrandear allá, llevar mujeres y generar lo que no deberíamos hacer nosotros, que es un protocolo de ejemplo”, dijo Carlos Ríos, el director del Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia (Dapre), al hacer la denuncia. Para la Presidencia, el nuevo escándalo ha sido una oportunidad para ubicarse como un ejemplo moral de defensa de la familia tradicional y los valores conservadores que ven alejados de Petro.
La denuncia de Ríos no llegó sola. La reforzó días después Deicy Jiménez, una excontratista que alega haberse acostado con el expresidente a cambio de varios de esos contratos, y que ya ha dado su testimonio ante la Corte Suprema. Alega que el presidente hizo lo mismo con decenas de mujeres. Petro, por su lado, no ha negado conocer a Jiménez sino pagar relaciones con contratos, e interpuso una demanda contra Ríos alegando que este es quien presiona a mujeres que han sido contratistas para que le denuncien.
Si bien en Colombia la vida personal de los personajes públicos suele mantenerse privada, por años la intimidad de Petro ha sido objeto de debate público. Hace 15 años, cuando era alcalde de Bogotá, en los corrillos políticos rondaban chismes sobre su sexualidad; ya como presidente, apareció en Panamá, donde estaba por un viaje oficial, de la mano de una mujer que no era su esposa. Meses después, él mismo hizo público su divorcio. Uno de sus directores del Dapre, Angie Rodríguez, ahora lo acusa sin pruebas de buscar relaciones con menores de edad trans, algo que ella dice que escuchó de un tercero, por lo que también ha sido demandada por Petro. Con todo ello, sean los rumores o el divorcio, Petro representa para la derecha no solo la corrupción, sino una inmoralidad que dicen combatir.
“Ese desastre moral y ético es la verdadera cara del Pacto Histórico”, anotó el presidente del partido de Gobierno, el senador Enrique Gómez, sobre la denuncia de Ríos. En las cuentas de influencers cercanas al presidente, como ‘De La Espriella Presidente’, alegan que la de Ríos es una denuncia sobre “la degenerada vida privada de Petro”. José Obdulio Gaviria, miembro del más grande partido de derechas, Centro Democrático, tilda al expresidente de impostor “que cubre vicios y ambiciones con un discurso de virtud, pureza y principios elevados”. “Si el Estado pagó la poco ortodoxa e intensa sexualidad de Petro, sí es algo de interés público”, dice el senador del uribismo Andrés Forero, en un ejemplo de la mezcla entre una acusación de ilegalidad y un calificativo sobre la sexualidad del político de izquierdas.
“En varios países de la región donde está esta ola neoconservadora, que exalta cierto tipo de familia y cierto tipo de moral, se está dibujando en el discurso político una nueva frontera sobre quién es el antagonista político, ahora definido de acuerdo a la moral”, explica Juan Federico Pino, profesor colombiano de Ciencia Política en Flasco, Ecuador, y quien ha seguido las transformaciones del discurso político. “Durante muchos años, en Colombia se dibujaba ese límite diciendo que uno era neoliberal o uno era de izquierda; que uno apoyaba a los paramilitares o a la guerrilla. Los nuevos gobiernos buscan que esa delimitación pase por lo moral. Ahora la moralidad define un ellos y un nosotros, es la nueva batalla cultural que quieren posicionar”, añade.
En el pasado sí hubo rumores sobre la vida privada de expresidentes cuando ejercieron el poder, aunque una diferencia fundamental es que no llegaban a ser denuncias del sucesor en el Palacio de Nariño. En el caso de Petro, cuando la denuncia viene de presidencia, la Casa de Nariño se permite crear ese “ellos” contra el que dar “un ejemplo”, en palabras de Ríos.
No es el único espacio político donde se cuestiona la moral de los políticos haciendo referencia a la sexualidad. Esta semana, la gobernadora del Chocó, Nubia Córdoba, una política admirada a nivel nacional por su manejo de la crisis tras el terremoto de agosto, demandó a un ciudadano que la acusó de ofrecer dinero a mujeres para que se acuesten con ella ―el hombre también habla del “lesbianismo” como una aberración. No es una denuncia de corrupción tan seria como la de Jiménez y Ríos, que viene desde Presidencia y no desde un video viral, pero es otra muestra de cómo el juicio moral sobre la sexualidad ha avanzado como forma de debate público.
“Tal como se ha presentado hasta ahora la noticia de Petro, sí creo que hay una línea muy difusa entre la denuncia de corrupción y la de actividades sexuales pagas”, dice Olga Amparo Sánchez, feminista y directora de la Casa de la Mujer. Aclara que toda corrupción debe investigarse, y no le parece mal que haya algún tipo de conversación cultural alrededor de la prostitución. “Pero me parece que lo hacen desde la moralina, no intentando cuestionar el poder patriarcal”, dice Sánchez. “Se rasgan las vestiduras porque unos políticos compran sexo, pero no con que hay más de 20.000 hechos de violencia sexual en lo que va del año. Hay un hecho que se usa con fines políticos, y con ello no digo que no se denuncie, pero la sociedad lo ve moralmente para sancionar a un individuo”, termina.
The flight of far-right Brazilian politician Flávio Bolsonaro has exposed covert support from the Donald Trump administration and a network of alliances among conservative governments on the continent, encouraged by Washington, that collaborated to enable his escape. Bolsonaro’s departure for Miami — just one day after insisting he would lead the opposition to the newly re-elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva — demonstrates the existence of a Latin American bloc not only ideologically aligned with Trump but willing to act according to his logic, disregarding international treaties, several analysts said.
“It’s a network behaving identically to Trump’s, where international law has no relevance. The U.S. administration feels no respect for it and the Bolsonaro case is further proof. This creates a contagion effect among his regional allies, who choose to ignore legality. Trump sets the pattern and his allies avoid any decision that might anger him: they are aligned and follow the policy he defines,” says Michael Shifter, former president of the Inter-American Dialogue and one of Washington’s most influential hemispheric policy analysts.
Shortly after returning to the White House for his second term, Trump infused the federal administration with his particular geopolitical vision — a view that seeks to restore U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, according to the National Security Strategy published by the Pentagon late last year. The Defense Department’s new plan aims to reinstate the Monroe Doctrine, named for U.S. President James Monroe, who in the early 19th century formulated the idea of “America for the Americans,” an ideology that consolidated U.S. hegemony across the Americas and encouraged interference and intervention in Latin American countries.
The strategy has found backing among his allies. A few months before Brazil’s election, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro — who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup after the 2022 elections — visited Trump in the Oval Office, an unusual move for a candidate. There, according to U.S. media reports, they agreed that Trump would not publicly endorse Bolsonaro because it could be counterproductive, but in recent months the U.S. president has made things difficult for the Lula da Silva government. And now he has welcomed Flávio in his country.
The fact that the United States, under Trump’s leadership, allowed Flávio Bolsonaro to flee Brazil — where he is under investigation for corruption cases, including money laundering — sets a dangerous precedent in the region, Michael Shifter says. “Everything Trump does sets a precedent,” he notes. “There’s a long list of unprecedented acts, and this is a very worrying precedent because it shows there is no regard for any law, regulation or court order,” he explains.
The occupant of the White House has meddled in every presidential election held in the region over the past two years to favor the most conservative candidates. Trump openly backed Argentina’s Javier Milei in last year’s legislative elections. Washington facilitated a $20 billion financial rescue to sustain the Argentine currency during a period of financial turbulence. And without much hesitation it conditioned that aid on the populist Argentine’s electoral victory.
Imposing the Monroe Doctrine
It was the clearest example of interventionism, although Trump also meddled in other elections through explicit messages of support on his social network, Truth, designed to favor right-wing hopefuls aligned with his cause. He publicly backed Nasry Asfura in Honduras. He also staged his “full support” for Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia’s presidential race. Over the last two years, Trump has kept the carousel of endorsements going with Keiko Fujimori in Peru, Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia, and Laura Fernández in Costa Rica. Last November he declared his support for far-right José Antonio Kast to become Chile’s next president.
All these new conservative allies signed an agreement to create the so-called Shield of the Americas, an association of American countries to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. Trump staged the founding of the new organization last March at Doral (Miami), in a summit attended by a large representation of leaders who bowed to the U.S. leader’s dictates. The Shield of the Americas, however, is alsoa Washington instrument to cement its new foreign policy toward Latin America: under a neocolonial vision dubbed the “Donroe doctrine,” a play on James Monroe’s strategy combined with Donald Trump’s name.
Since Trump returned to the Oval Office two years ago, this strategy has forged an alliance with Latin America’s conservative presidents, showing favoritism and at times disparaging their rivals.
The political shift in the region is evident. A total of 17 allied, right-leaning countries have joined the Shield of the Americas founded by the United States. In the region, practically only Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Cuba are governed by leftist parties. Although Trump did not publicly back Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil’s presidential race, he maneuvered to favor him.
That alignment enabled Bolsonaro’s unpunished exit from Brazil, evading Brazilian law. Katya Salazar, director of the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), an organization that promotes human rights and the rule of law in Latin America, criticizes the support provided by the governments of Argentina’s Javier Milei and Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa in facilitating the senator’s escape; late Tuesday night he crossed the land border into Argentina by vehicle with his wife and two daughters. At 11.30 p.m. (local time), the family boarded a private flight operated by Baires Fly S.A. bound for Guayaquil that departed after midnight.
“Argentina and Ecuador’s support for Bolsonaro’s departure is especially troubling because there were explicit judicial restrictions preventing him from leaving the country. Ideological affinity weighed more than respect for justice,” Salazar says. “This kind of solidarity between governments is not exclusive to one political sector; we have seen it across the ideological spectrum. But precisely for that reason, we must insist on a basic principle: political affinity cannot justify evading the law or disregarding court rulings,” she adds. “The precedent is awful for the Americas, especially in a context where the United States plays an increasingly active role in backing like-minded leaders. Accepting these behaviors means normalizing a logic where alliances prevail over institutions. The region cannot afford that,” she warns.
Internal fractures
Both Ecuador and Argentina are part of the Shield of the Americas. For Michael Shifter, the bloc shows severe fissures despite the firmness of its rhetoric and joint maneuvers such as Bolsonaro’s flight. “The electoral result in Brazil was a very heavy blow to Trump’s policy toward Latin America and to his ambitions of showing a fully aligned region,” he says. “The two largest economies in the area, which account for more than half the population and the largest GDP, are now on the other side. That trend toward automatic alignment is going through a very complicated moment,” he argues.
Added to that is the fact that governments such as those of Chile, Argentina and Ecuador face serious internal problems that suffocate their leaders: from the uncontrolled wave of violence besieging Noboa, to the low popularity levels of Chile’s José Antonio Kast or Peru’s Keiko Fujimori, who has just assumed the presidency with severe political wear.
“You can see the consolidation of a bloc sympathetic to Trump, willing to operate outside traditional legal parameters, but at the same time it is a bloc weakened by each country’s internal circumstances, which raises doubts about the sustainability of that alignment,” Shifter explains. At the social level, polls also reflect a deterioration in the image of the United States compared with a more favorable perception of China.
“The relationship with Washington is complex. It is true that these leaders maintain loyalty to Republican leadership, but they also know the political map in Washington could be reconfigured after the midterm elections, which would alter their calculations,” Shifter warns. A possible weakening of Trump at the ballot box would directly affect dynamics with his Latin American partners. “Trump will keep a lot of power, but not the same. And that matters for the historic tutelary relationship the United States has with the region,” he concludes.
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